SSC10-XII-1
Initial Flight Results for an Automated Satellite Beacon Health Monitoring Network
Anthony Young, Christopher Kitts, Michael Neumann, Ignacio Mas, Mike Rasay
Robotic Systems Laboratory - Santa Clara University
500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053; (408) 554-4000
A. Young: ayoung87@gmail.com
C. Kitts: ckitts@engr.scu.edu
ABSTRACT
Beacon monitoring is an automated satellite health monitoring architecture that combines telemetry analysis,
periodic low data rate message broadcasts by a spacecraft, and automated ground reception and data handling in
order to implement a cost-effective anomaly detection and notification capability for spacecraft missions. Over the
past two decades, this architecture has been explored and prototyped for a range of spacecraft mission classes to
include use on NASA deep space probes, military spacecraft, and small satellites. This previous work has also
included formalization of performance assessment metrics to capture the cost and performance of the anomaly
detection and notification tasks, thereby allowing a characterization of the suitability of beacon monitoring
implementations for specific missions. In this paper, we describe a newly implemented beacon architecture that has
been developed and commissioned for operation in support of several NASA and university-class small spacecraft.
The architecture consists of a spacecraft with a beacon transmission system, a network of four automated receiveonly communications stations installed across the United States, Internet-based ground segment communications
allowing centralized processing and logging of all received beacon messages, and a notification service for alerting
on-call operators to anomalous conditions. We also present initial operational results for this network as applied to
the NASA GeneSat-1 spacecraft, which has been operated by Santa Clara University students since its launch in
December 2006. Finally, we describe future adaptations that are planned for this system given its pending use in
supporting two additional NASA spacecraft due to be launched later in 2010. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the
first example of an operational satellite beacon-based health monitoring network.
Ground automation is often introduced to address this
cost challenge. This automation is typically in the form
of software-based telemetry limit checking (TLC)
which is used to alert, and in some cases to replace,
operators. This software often takes the form of an
“expert system,” which more precisely is generally a
production rule system relying on an experiential
knowledge base. Results have shown this approach to
successfully address the personnel costs [5-6]; however,
it does not eliminate communication expenses given the
continuing need for standard telemetry services.

INTRODUCTION
Anomalies are unexpected conditions that occur in a
functional engineering system [1]. To maintain the
functional capability of a system, anomalies must be
rapidly detected, precisely diagnosed, and effectively
resolved.
For space systems, managing anomalies can be
particularly challenging given the system’s complexity,
its remote location, and limits on availability,
observability, and controllability. Nevertheless, high
performance in the detection, diagnosis, and resolution
of anomalies is necessary in order to maintain the
operational status of systems, which can cost on the
order of hundreds of millions of dollars.

THE BEACON MONITORING CONCEPT
Beacon monitoring has been explored by several
satellite operations organizations as a means of
addressing communication costs relevant to detecting
spacecraft anomalies.
In the beacon monitoring
concept, depicted in Figure 1, a low data rate satellite
“beacon” communicates a small amount of satellite data
to the ground. This data is automatically received and
processed on the ground such that automated decisions
regarding the presence of anomalies are made. If such
anomalies are detected, a human operations crew is
notified in order to take appropriate action.

Assessing the health, or lack thereof, of a space system
has traditionally been done by human operators through
the analysis of satellite telemetry broadcast to the
ground. This approach can be very costly, however,
given the required expertise of the operators, the need
to have these operators available around the clock, and
the cost of ground segment communication resources
[2-4].
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seconds given the very long communication
distances involved [10]. Large parabolic antennae
on the order of 8- or 34-meters in diameter would
be required, but this was still a dramatic change to
the standard use of the Deep Space Network’s 70meter antennae. A prototype demonstration of this
technology was conducted for a period of one
month during 1999 on the Deep Space 1 mission
[11].
Figure 1: Beacon Monitoring Concept [7].



The cost advantage for this architecture lies in the low
data rate nature of the communications link. The low
data rate dramatically improves the downlink’s signal
to noise ratio to the point that much less capable (e.g.,
lower gain and sometimes omnidirectional) and
therefore lower cost ground stations may be used; these
stations are often simple enough that they may be
reliably automated in a low-cost manner. For very
simple spacecraft, such as some nanosatellites, a
significant number of critical telemetry values sufficient
for health analysis might be capable of being
downloaded using this approach. On more complex
spacecraft, the beacon monitoring concept often
assumes the use of on-board telemetry analysis such
that a compact health assessment message is produced
and communicated through the beacon communications
network.

For the work presented in this paper, the satellite in
question, GeneSat-1, is so simple that a significant
fraction of its critical telemetry is broadcast through the
beacon. Filtering of this data is performed on the
ground to detect on-board anomalies. Furthermore, the
scope of anomaly detection is not just the spacecraft,
but also the receive stations, the central workstation,
and the human operators; simple anomalies in any of
portions of the system are detected and communicated
appropriately. In addition, to the knowledge of the
operators, this system is the first beacon monitoring
system put into standard operation for a space mission.

Prior Beacon Monitoring Systems
Beacon monitoring has been explored and prototyped
for a wide variety of spacecraft missions.




The U.S. Department of Defense developed their
beacon monitoring concept, called “Lifeline,” in
the early 1990’s for spacecraft constellations such
as the Global Positioning System and the Defense
Satellite Communications System [8]. In this
concept, a 3-bit health assessment was produced
on-board spacecraft and combined with the
spacecraft’s ID and position state vector. This
message was periodically broadcast at a rate of 10100 bits/sec, received by automated stations, and
forwarded to a staffed central operations center.
The concept was endorsed as being an enabling
technology for low-cost operations; however, it
was not adopted [9].

The Pros and Cons of Beacon Monitoring Systems
Beacon monitoring is typically offered as an option in
order to address cost issues related to nominal health
monitoring operations.
Prior work in this area,
however, has identified a set of competitive metrics that
quantify performance and allow the net value of the use
of such a system to be assessed [7].

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory has explored and
prototyped beacon systems for deep space probes
during their cruise phase, which may last on the
order of years. Their objective has been to use a
beacon system in order to reduce standard health
contacts by an order of magnitude to a level of one
every few weeks. Their early concept was to use a
two-bit health assessment broadcast over 1000’s of
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In the small satellite community, the Sapphire
microsatellite [12] was used in the late 1990’s to
verify low-cost beacon monitoring technology and
to validate its use through comparative evaluation
with standard anomaly management techniques.
Sapphire used an on-board production rule system
[13], periodically-broadcast amateur radio packets,
and a custom-built low-cost receive station [14] to
implement a demonstration system. While the
system was successfully evaluated in ground test, it
was never put into routine operational use once
Sapphire was launched.
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Cost of Notification: From a cost perspective, cost
reductions in real-time contact operations must be
balanced with investment in and operation of the
beacon monitoring network.



Timeliness of Notification: From a time
perspective, the driving issue is the update rate of
health assessments; it is often the case that many
more health updates/day can be achieved with a
modest beacon network.
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operators. The system block diagram, shown in Figure
2, outlines the connectivity of components, the data
path along with the control paths necessary for
providing system automation, and the distribution of
data handling resources. In conjunction with the
GeneSat-1 satellite, a triple CubeSat developed at the
NASA Ames Research Center, the distributed beacon
health monitoring system has been validated and
experimentation with anomaly detection has been
conducted.

Quality of Notification: For beacon monitoring
systems, quality is driven primarily by the scope
and fidelity of the automated reasoning system
used to detect anomalies. It may be the case that
confidence in such reasoning techniques is such
that the quality of automated analysis is considered
to be lower than that of a human operator. In such
cases, beacon-based health monitoring can be used
to extend times between human-based contacts
until such time that a human-based contact is
required to maintain an appropriate level of
confidence. In [7], an analysis is provided to
indicate how contact requirements can be modified
in order to ensure a required level of confidence in
a satellite’s health assessment.

GeneSat-1 Background
GeneSat-1 served to further understanding of the
viability of long-duration human space travel. The E.
coli growth experiment was successfully conducted in
December of 2006. GeneSat-1, in its end-of-life phase,
still serves as a critical component in the current beacon
health monitoring network.

IMPLEMENTATION
The SCU beacon health monitoring network is a
geographically distributed network of four automated
receive-only communications stations installed across
the United States.
Each station consists of an
omnidirectional antenna, a pre-amplifier, a transceiver,
a terminal node controller (TNC), and an Internet
connected computer. Data received at each station is
forwarded to a data handling system, which also
performs orbit prediction, data logging, anomaly
detection, and systematic state updates for mission

Patch and whip antennae are used for S-Band and UHF
communications, respectively. The S-Band link is used
for commanding and downloading archived data, while
the UHF link is used only for transmitting beacon data.
GeneSat-1 uses permanent magnets for coarse attitude
control. The orbit is roughly circular with an altitude of
300 km and an inclination of 40°.
Beacon packets, consisting of 64 bytes of data

Figure 2: Receive-only station and full beacon monitoring network diagrams.
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Station Automation. Applications with minimal system
computation requirements enable the use of a low-cost
netbook to provide a fully functional receive-only
station.

represented in hexadecimal, are broadcast using the
AX.25 packet protocol and contain key pieces of realtime telemetry and state data. An example of the raw
packet data is as follows:
GeneSat1.org17F10F4B0011003E033500260068009EB3
3A126236F812064002

Ham Radio Deluxe (HRD), freely available for HAM
radio amateurs, provides computer control for
commonly used transceivers. HRD is used to automate
the Doppler shift compensation needed to receive
beacon packets. In addition, HRD provides automatic
updating of the most current two-line element (TLE)
sets.

Included in the packet is telemetry data such as payload
temperature, bus time, and solar panel currents, which
provide a means to conduct research in anomaly
management.
Receive-Only Station

The terminal node controller (TNC), which is
responsible for data handling prescribed by the AX.25
packet protocol, is connected to the station computer
that, in turn, forwards raw beacon information within
the beacon monitoring network. The software
associated with the data communication and forwarding
process also provides the means by which to configure
TNC settings as necessary.

Functional requirements of the beacon health
monitoring system outline receive capabilities from the
distributed stations as sufficient. Thus, the station
design goals focused on automation and minimization
of maintenance due to limited capacity to physically
access station equipment.
Omnidirectional Antenna. An omnidirectional antenna
was chosen as an alternative to an antenna rotor and
pointing system. Although the omnidirectional antenna
resulted in a significant performance loss as compared
to a directional high gain antenna, this trade-off has
proven to be acceptable given the intended system
function; the existence of data, even at relatively low
frequency, is sufficient to support anomaly detection.
The omnidirectional antenna, shown in Figure 3,
provides significant reductions in both fixed station and
maintenance costs by eliminating the need for a rotor
and associated maintenance costs and time.

Handling of data communication is accomplished
through the use of the Creare DataTurbine Ring
Buffered Network Bus software server.
The
DataTurbine, which has also been employed for the
implementation of the RSL satellite operations software
suite, serves as the medium through which data is
transmitted to the central data handling software suite.
Along with the functional responsibilities of HRD,
Figure 4 shows the flow of data within the software
services.

Figure 4: Functional diagram of the services on the
receive-only station computer which provide
automated beacon receive tasks.

Figure 3: Omnidirectional antenna setup, showing
the pre-amplifier and mechanical stand.
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As part of the performance characterization of the
beacon monitoring network, Satellite Tool Kit (STK)
has been used to log the relative azimuth and elevation
of each packet received by a given station. Figure 6
shows the distribution of beacon packets received by
the four stations, along with the total number of packets
received by each station.

Geographically Distributed Network
There are currently four automated receive-only
communications stations installed across the United
States. These stations are located at Santa Clara
University in California (SCU), St. Louis University in
Missouri (STL), Pennsylvania (PA), and University of
Hawaii at Manoa in Hawaii (HI). Table 1 presents the
deployment date and latitude of each facility.
Table 1: Deployment Date, Latitude, and Packet
Summary of Each Receive-Only Station
Facility
Name

Deployment
Date

Latitude

Total
Packets

Packets Per
Week

SCU

2010-01-14

37.35 N

733

35

PA

2010-01-14

40.16 N

121

6

STL

2010-02-27

38.64 N

256

19

HI

2010-05-07

21.30 N

48

16

The loss in performance resulting from the use of an
omnidirectional antenna is supplemented by including
multiple receive-only stations as part of the beacon
monitoring system. The geographic distribution, as
shown in Figure 5, provides increased coverage and an
improved ability to track the real-time state of the
spacecraft while collecting data over all four stations.
For a single satellite pass, the current configuration of
stations is capable of providing a three-fold increase in
consecutive line-of-sight time, e.g., 9 minutes for one
station vs. 27 minutes from AOS at HI to LOS at PA.

Figure 6: GeneSat-1 azimuth and elevation of
beacon packets received by the receive-only stations.

Figure 5: Beacon Health Monitoring Network consists of four geographically distributed receive-only
communications stations.
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5

24th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

It is worth pointing out that a given station’s latitude
constrains the range of azimuth and elevation from
which packets can be received. Further, GeneSat-1
characterization data up to this point has revealed that
the current receive-only station design performs best
when the satellite is above an elevation of 40° relative
to a given station.
Central Data Handling Software Suite
The central data handling suite, supported by the
geographically distributed, automated receive-only
stations, represents the core functionality of the beacon
health monitoring network.
The suite utilizes
MATLAB, STK, and MySQL database to provide
automated anomaly detection and operator notification
functions. Although an instance of the software suite is
currently running at SCU, the Internet-based
architecture of the monitoring network allows the data
handling suite to operate at any location.

Figure 7: An example of the interactions between
MATLAB, STK, and MySQL showing the data
which is exchanged for beacon network
performance characterization.

STK is used for calculating pass times for contact
planning and pass statistics. TLE sets provided by
Space Track (www.space-track.org) are automatically
retrieved once a day and are used by STK to determine
azimuth, elevation, range (AER) calculations for
characterization of the beacon monitoring network.
Figure 7 shows an example of this STK usage.

Implementation of Rules
Anomaly detection is carried out by a set of predefined
rules based on expert knowledge of the overall system.
Spacecraft-specific anomalies are monitored by
checking data which is available in the beacon packets.
Anomaly checking for the ground segment is
accomplished by making use of the stored data in the
central database.

A MySQL database instance stores both fixed and
dynamic information. Static information includes
facility names and locations, satellite names and IDs,
and the information of mission operators. Dynamic
information includes pass times, raw beacon packet
data, incoming and outgoing messages, and anomaly
details. This set of information is maintained for the
complete process of detecting anomalies and notifying
mission operators of any information that provides
insight to diagnosing and resolving any anomalies.

Packet rules consist of a logic statement constraining
the range of a given sensor value. For example, the
payload temperature control for GeneSat-1 is designed
to maintain temperature at a desired set point to within
+/- 1°C. This constraint is implemented by checking
the following logic statement:

The MATLAB/Simulink platform is utilized for the
computational tools that ultimately serve as the means
by which to accomplish anomaly detection. The
Simulink modeling environment will be leveraged for
the further investigation of model-based reasoning for
anomaly management. A software service, running
within the MATLAB Java Virtual Machine (JVM),
provides an application interface between the
DataTurbine to MATLAB-based functions that provide
all data handling functionality. Implemented functions
are called when beacon data is published by any of the
remote stations. The functions parse, calibrate, and
archive data to the system database. Combined with
the archiving of data, functions for validating nominal
function of the spacecraft and ground station determine
whether an anomaly exists and which operators are to
be notified for further investigation of the anomaly.
Young

ExpTempM > 15000 && ExpTempM < 17000

Note that ExpTempM represents the payload temperature,
which is represented in milli-degrees C. Thus, for this
case, the nominal operating temperature range is 15 to
17°C.
As another packet rule example, the on-board computer
startup counter is included in the beacon packet. The
known value is 1, which is constrained using the
following statement:
StartupCounter == 1

If the startup counter value changes, e.g., to 2,
indicating a bus reset, the cause of which is a potential
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anomaly, further investigation is required and operators
are notified appropriately.

Operators confirm receipt of the notification message
by replying to the email. Once an operator has replied,
all on-call operators, including the operator who has
replied, are sent a confirmation receipt, indicating that
the operator confirmation was received successfully by
the central data handling suite. Upon confirmation of
the anomaly notification, it is left to the operations team
to decide on what actions are to be taken.

Ground segment rules are implemented in a similar
manner. Based on the orbit profile of GeneSat-1 and
the expected performance of the receive-only network,
it is expected that each station receive a beacon packet
at least once every 24 hours.
Thus, rules are
implemented to check that the timestamp of the last
packet for a given station is not greater than 24 hours.
For example, the rule for the STL station which must
hold true in order to ensure nominal operating
conditions is as follows:

In addition to anomaly notification messages, an on-call
operator check-in is implemented, which provides
operators with the knowledge that the notification
system is working, and it is a way for the automated
notification system to know that on-call operators are,
in fact, on call. This check-in is performed once a day.
If there is no check-in from at least one on-call operator
within 24 hours, the entire operations team is notified.
On the contrary, if the on-call operators do not receive a
check-in notice during a given 24-hour period, it is
assumed that there is a potential anomaly with the
central data handling suite and/or the associated
equipment, and thus investigation into the potential
anomaly is required.

STLLastBeaconTime < 24

Notification System
The notification system is centered around two primary
software functions implemented in MATLAB: an
automated email handler which checks email and logs
incoming messages with operator info, message
content, and message time, and an anomaly checking
handler which checks decoded beacon packets as well
as various other checks implemented by operators. The
interaction between MATLAB and MySQL and
operators is shown in Figure 8.

RESULTS
The beacon health monitoring network has been
operational since January 2010, with all four stations
running and successfully forwarding beacon data as of
May 2010. Part of the experiment has been assessing
the acceptability of the data frequency which the
current beacon monitoring network provides.
Successful detection of various spacecraft and ground
segment anomalies has shown that beacon packet
frequency on the order of ten packets per week is
acceptable.
The following sections describe two
instances of anomalies and the associated investigations
and actions taken for each.
STL Facility Outage

Figure 8: Interactions between MATLAB, MySQL,
and operators showing operator notification and
response.

A 24-hour timeout flag for the STL facility prompted
investigation into the operational status of the station.
The inability to log in to the remote workstation
prompted correspondence with the STL facility point of
contact. It was determined that the source of the
anomaly was a lab reorganization, which left the
workstation in an unintended, unpowered configuration.
Once power was restored, the workstation was
successfully checked out and nominal operation
resumed.

On-call operators are notified upon detection of a
potential anomaly. Currently, the notification consists
of an email message which includes the time of
anomaly detection, the rule or constraint which was
violated, the value or relevant parameter which
triggered the detection of the anomaly, and a request for
confirmation. An example message sent to an operator
for the HI (Hawaii) station violating the 24-hour packet
rule is as follows:

GeneSat-1 Temperature Sensor Anomaly

An anomaly (anomalyid94) was detected at 201005-30 20:54:47 (UTC) due to
''HILastBeaconTime = 30.5056'', which violates
''HILastBeaconTime < 24'' (ruleid9). Please
confirm receipt of this notification message.
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A described earlier, a rule was implemented to check
that the payload temperature was within an acceptable
range, given a known set point temperature and a
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Finally, beacon technology will be applied to nonspacecraft systems in order to reap its benefits in
different domains. For example, the technology will
soon be incorporated into the operation of an
autonomous bathymetric mapping boat built at Santa
Clara and being prepared for estuary and coastal water
deployments on behalf of NOAA. The applicability of
beacon technology to systems as diverse as spacecraft
and boats demonstrates its general applicability in
improving the manner in which anomalies are managed
in complex engineering systems.

temperature control tolerance of +/- 1°C.
High
frequency violation of this rule led to further
investigation and it was determined that not only was
the temperature sensor data being broadcast in the
beacon packet corrupt, but examination of telemetry
data downloaded through the S-Band communications
link resulted in the realization that payload temperature
control had been lost.
The sensor anomaly was determined to be acceptable
given the post-experiment, non-critical mission phase.
Temperature control was no longer needed and thus the
rule/constraint for payload temperature was relaxed (no
longer checked).

CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the design of an
operational beacon monitoring system currently in use
for routine health operations for the NASA GeneSat-1
spacecraft. The system consists of four automated,
receive-only communication stations located across the
United States, Internet ground segment links to the
Santa Clara University operations facility, a central
workstation that archives messages and performs
anomaly detection functions, and an on-call satellite
operations team. To the knowledge of the authors, this
is the first operational beacon monitoring network. In
addition, it is unique in that the scope of its anomaly
detection analysis consists not just of the spacecraft but
also of the communication stations, the central server
and the operations team. The system has successfully
detected and notified operators of a number of
operational anomalies. A number of extensions are
planned for this system in order to improve its costeffectiveness, and the system will be used for routine
operations for two new NASA nanospacecraft due to be
launched later in 2010.

FUTURE WORK
A number of improvements and extensions are being
planned for the beacon monitoring system given its
pending operational use for a number of additional
spacecraft, to include NASA’s O/OREOS and
NanoSail-D, both scheduled to launch in September
2010.
First, the receive stations are being adapted to
automatically support multiple spacecraft.
This
requires station radios to be tuned to the appropriate
downlink frequencies as a function of the expected
contact schedule. Second, a more refined operator
notification system is being developed to accommodate
varying degrees of alert levels. Third, software-defined
radios will be explored as a low-cost alternative to
providing easily tunable and consolidated signal
processing services within the beacon stations.
Given Santa Clara’s expertise in advanced reasoning
techniques for detecting, diagnosing and resolving
anomalies, a significant upgrade of particular interest
focuses on the reasoning techniques used to perform
anomaly detection within the beacon network. In
particular, model-based reasoning algorithms will be
incorporated into the system in order to provide more
precise and focused anomaly detection and to also
support diagnostic and anomaly resolution activities
within Santa Clara’s satellite operations environment.
Furthermore, the incorporation of such advanced
reasoning systems on-board the spacecraft is being
explored for future missions [15].
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performance of beacon monitoring technology. This
will be done by collecting long term performance data
and using conceptually formulated performance metrics
to assess cost, timeliness and quality of anomaly
detection and notification tasks in satellite operations
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